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MISLEADING STATEMENTS BY DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
Throughout defendants-respondents' Brief there are state-
ments and assertions that tend to mislead. 
The Statement of Facts presented by them is colored by the 
general statement, page S: 
"TIMECO resisted paying royalties accruing during the period 
prior to July, 1975. ", 
without supporting citation to the Record, and by the inflammatory and 
argumentative assertion: 
"In consonance with its well established position of resisting pay-
ment of royalties ... ". 
Plaintiff-Appellant (TIM ECO) instituted this lawsuit for the pur-
pose of adjudicating conflicting co'ntentions of the parties with respect 
to the patent rights concerned and seeking an injunction against and 
damages for competition thought to be illegal in view of such patent 
rights (R 2-7, 92-100). Royalties had been paid long before July, 1975 
by TIMECO's predecessor, Brimco Hydraulics & Engineering, Inc. 
(R. 608-609, 611), and were being paid by TIMECO subsequent to its 
acquisition of Brimco Hydraulics & Engineering, Inc. 's rights, sub-
ject only to determination of the conflicting contentions of the parties 
(R. 612, 622 ). It was only when TIMECO's attorney obtained informa-
tion as to Kenworth's (customer of adverse licensee Brimhall Products 
Co. but formerly customer of Brimco) stand on invalidity of the 
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Brimhall "Cab Latch" patent (R. 544-562) that Tll\1ECO resisted 
further royalty poyments on that cab latch under the U.S. Supreme 
Court doctrine of Leor v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). Such resisuinc. 
has no relevancy to this appeol, since the question is solely whether 
royalties are payable on the cab latch patented to Messrs. Nordell 
and Kimball (the so-called "black cab latch"). Royalties have been 
fully paid and are being paid on a continuing basis for all Brimhall "Cab 
Latches" and "Valve Systems" sold by TIMECO. 
Defendants-Respondents assen (page 6) that, by Judge Croft's 
decision of May 2, 1977, (R. 823-825) their Exception to the Sufficiency 
of the Bond (R. 808-809) was sustained, without making it clear that 
judge Croft was concerned only with the supersedea s a speer of the 
matter relative to a stay of proceedings in the lower court. The pro-
ceedings were not stayed and are continuing in the lower court from 
the accounting standpoint and to determine defendant-respondents' lia· 
biliry for damages and possible off-set. Judge Croft was not concerned 
with the sufficiency of the undenaking under Rule 73(c) for costs of 
this appeal. As applied to defendants-respondents' argumerits, the 
assertion is misleading and the fact recitation has no relevancy to 
this appeal. 
Defendants-Respondents assert (poge 7) that Tll'v1ECO itself 
asserts that its motion of January 31, 1977, was for a new trial under 
-2-
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Rule 59, and cite R-755 in support. This is positively misleading on 
an important issue. TIMECO has never asserted that its motion was 
for a new trial, and R-755 gives no support to defendants-respondents' 
statement. On the contrary, TIMECO stated in its Notice of Appeal 
(R-794-795) that the lower court "refused to alter or amend its order 
of January 24, 1977" in response to plaintiff's motion under Rule 59. 
Thus, the appeal was clearly taken under the provisions of Rule 59 (e), 
rather than under the provisions of Rule 59(a ). 
Defendants-Respondents imply (page 9) that the reason the 
undertaking by Messrs. Kimball and Nordell for costs on this appeal 
under the provisions of Rule 73( c) is insufficient is because they would 
be reluctant or unable to pay. However, no such reasons were set forth 
in the exception (R. 808-809) filed by them. 
Defendants-Respondents assert (page 13) that TIMECO acknow-
ledges that the trial court visually observed evidence at the hearing on 
December 22, 1977. T!MECO does no such thing. Any visual observa-
tion of physical exhibits was afte:r the hearing and strictly off the record. 
As a matter of law, it could have played no part in the lower court's 
decision on plaintiff-appellant's motion. 
On page 16, defendants-respondents make an absolutely false 
assertion to the effect that the court proceedings continued unreported 
without objection by TIMECO. Not only did TIMECO vigorously object 
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to any continuance of the proceedings upon departure of the court 
reporter, but the hearing was terminated forthwith. 
On page 17, it is stated that: 
"TIMECO also argues that the Trial Court should (emphasis 
added) have found that royalties are due under the exclusive 
license 'on any cab latch"'. 
This is not so. TIMECO's argument is that the lower court's decision t' 
equivalent to a finding that royalties are due on any cab latch having supc 
ficial similarity to the Brimhall cab latch, and that such a decision has 
no legal justification. 
ARGUMENT BY DEFENDANTS-RESFDNDENTS 
Notice of Appeal Fatally Defective 
Defendants-Respondents argue that plaintiff-appellant's Notice 
of Appeal is fatally defective, because it appeals from the Order of 
April 11, 1977, rather than from the Order of January 24, 1977. 
The Order of April 11, 1977 denied plaintiff-appellant's 
''Motion for Review and Withdrawal of Memorandum Decision and for 
Evidentiary Hearing". That motion was filed by plaintiff-appellant on 
January 31, 1977, and was not a motion for a new trial as said to be 
by defendants-respondents. Rather, in substance and effect it was a 
motion to alter or amend the judgment of January 24, 1977, as pro-
vided for by Rule 59(e) of the Utah Hules of Civil Procedure. Thus, 
plaintiff-appellant's motion effectively stayed the time for appeal fll·: 
the lower court's order of January 24, 1977 as provided by Rule 73,JI, ! 
-4-
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which srntcs that the full time for appeal begins to nm a!'tcr an order 
"granting or denying a 1notion under Hulc 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment". 
Plaintiff-Appellant submits that its Notice of Appeal is not 
defective. It gives adequate notice of appeal based on the order of 
January 24, 1977, which order the lower court refused (by order of 
April 11, 1977) to alter or :.imend. The Notice of Appeal specifically 
sets forth the grounds of appeal as being the lower court's determination 
that plaintiff-appellant is liable "'to pay royalties on a certain product". 
The cases cited by defendants -respondents in support of 
their argument are not in point. Plaintiff-Appellant's motion of Janu-
ary 31, 1977, was not a motion for a new trial and the lower court's 
order of April 11, 1977, was not an order denying a new trial. 
Insufficient Security on Appeal 
Defendants-Respondents next argue that plaintiff-appellant's 
security on appeal is insufficient. They assert that Rule 73(c) requires 
a "bond" on appeal and that an "undertaking" does not satisfy the require-
ment of a bond. Rule 73( c) is entitled "Bond on Appeal" and Rule 73(d) 
is entitled "Supersedeas Bond". Rule 73(f), entitled "Judgment against 
Surety", states "'The bond or undertaking (emphasis added) given pur-
suant to subdivisions (c) ond (d) of the rule, shall, ... ". This 
seems to clearly indicate that an undertaking is the equivalent of a bond 
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on appeal and will satisfy the requirements of Rule 73(c). It is noted 
that all the requirements of 73(f) are met by plaintiff-appcllnnt's 
undertaking. 
Further, the Clerk's Certificate (R. 1), which appenrs to be 
a standard form, uses the term "Undertaking on Appeal" and indicates 
that it was in "due form" and "properly filed". 
Defendants-Respondents' "Notice of Exception to Sufficiency of 
Bond" filed with the lower court raised the technical objection based on 
semantics, but no other. The implication in their brief that the parties 
to the undertaking may not be willing to pay or may not be financially 
responsible, is entirely new, unsupported, and inappropriate to raise 
at this late date. As previously indicated, Judge Crofts' decision of 
May 2, 1977, was to the effect that Rule 73(b) and Rule 62(d) require 
a supersedeas bond in order for proceedings in the lower court to be 
stayed during an appeal. He ordered that proceedings below not be 
stayed pending this appeal and that a hearing be had to determine the 
amount of royalties due from plnintiff-appellnm to defendants-respon-
dents. His decision nnd resulting order had nothing to do with and in Ol' 
way supports the position ndvanced by defendants-respondents herein 
with respect to the undertaking on nppeal. It is submitted thnt plaintiff· 
appellant's undertaking is a proper cost bond under Hule 73(c). 
-6-
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Appeal Untimely 
Defendants-Respondents also argue that plaintiff-appellant's 
appeal is untimely, since it was not filed within thirty days of the 
January 24, 1977 order. As previously pointed out, plaintiff-appellant 
filed a motion on January 31, 1977, which effectively stayed the per-
iod for appeal from the January 24, 1977 order, because it sought 
alteration or amendment of that order. The appeal herein was filed 
on April 13, 1977, two days after the denial (on April 11, 1977) of 
plaintiff-appellant's motion. The appeal is thus timely taken. 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS 
Evidence Before the Court Sufficient 
Defendants-Respondents point to the voluminous record in this 
case as indicating that the lower court had the necessary evidence 
before it to determine patent infringement. Yet, this case has 
involved many issues, and the voluminous record deals with all of 
these, except squarely with the question of concern here, i.e., 
whether or not the so-called "black cab latch" infringes any valid 
claim of the Brimhall patent. In this regard, during the hearing before 
the lower court on December 22, 1976, the court said (R 856-857): 
THE COURT: May I make a very brief observation, 
and that is this: It seems to me if the issues become 
whether or not the black latch is one upon which royalties 
should be paid, then l assume it becomes a rather tech-
nical issue involving expertsancl p<itent-lizer (patent 
license) testimony type thing. 
-7-
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MR. ROSSA: l should hope not, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Are you going to ask the Court to 
make comparisons just by observation, looking <Jt 
both lntchcs? (emphasis added) 
MR. ROSSA: We have them here for the Coun's 
inspection. 
THE COURT: I understand you have. I am not 
the expert. (emphasis added) 
These comments are most certainly an indication by the 
lower court that it did not have sufficient evidence to make a deter-
mination of infringement or validity. Moreover, the Findings of 
Fact (Para. 15, R. 609) establish plaintiff--appellant's implied ex-
elusive license in terms of: 
" ••• to make, use and sell devices covered by the claims of 
the 'Valve System' patent and 'Cab Lntch' application ... " 
(emphasis added). 
There was no testimony, expert or otherwise, relating the claims to 
the physical structure of the "black cab latch". 
Defendants-Respondents list eight items of alleged evidence 
before the lower court bearing or. the question of infringement. As to 
these, it should be noted that Carol Brimhall Davis and Stephen D. 
Schultz are not pntent experts and are not skilled in the field of 
patent law. Thus, their affidavits to the effect thnt the "black cnb 
latch" infringes the Brimhall pment cnnnot be given any weight. f\Jl'td 
V. Trask is the nttorney for defendants-respondents, nnd, ns such, 
-8-
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cannot be regarded as an impartial expert witness. Significantly not 
included in the list is the affidavit of Philip A. Mallinckrodt of Dec-
ember 20, 1976 (:R. 724-725), which specifically refutes the several 
affidavits alleging infringement and shows that there is a question of 
fact that should have been determined by the lower c.oun on the basis 
of credible evidence. The "evidence" noted by defendants-respond-
ents on pages 13 and 14 of their brief as "unreported" and "not part 
of the Transcript of record" was not evidence and could not legiti-
mately have played any part in the decision. Judge Sawaya tenninated 
the court proceedings and dismissed the reporter for other pressing 
duties before there was any observation of physical exhibits (R 863). 
No Objection Offered in the Trial Court 
Defendants-Respondents argue that at the end of the hearing on 
December 22, 1976, the matter was submitted for decision without 
reservation or objection by plaintiff-respondent as having been de-
prived of an opportunity to present evidence. 
The hearing in question was on an ex pa rte order to show 
cause why plaintiff-respondent should not be held in contempt for fail-
ing to pay royalties as ordered and on a supplemental order for an 
accounting. Also considered at the hearing was plaintiff-respondent's 
Motion to Vacate such ex pane order on the ground that a motion for 
contempt is not 8 proper way of raising the issue of liability for 
-9-
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royalties on the so-called "black cab latch". 
When the Nordell -Kimball patent was offered in evidence by 
plaintiff-appellant, the lower court said (R 856): 
"On the issue of contempt, I would agree. It 
seems to me, however, that the principal issue ... 
is whether or not the question of whether or not 
royalties should be paid for the manufacture and 
sale of the black latch ... can be settled by a pro-
ceeding of this nature. I think that has to be 
determined before anything else is." 
On that basis, plaintiff-appellant withdrew the profered 
evidence with the comment that it may become pertinent at a later 
time. The lower court then proceeded to make its observation 
(R 856) quoted previously herein to the effect that if the issue 
became one of whether royalties should be paid on the "black latch" 
it would be a rather technical one involving experts and that he was 
not the expert who could make comparisons just by observation. 
Defendants-Respondants then suggested demonstrating 
"the factual evidence" to prove that the cab latches in question are 
"vii tually identical". This the lower court did net permit. 
Thus, there was nothing for plaintiff-appellant to object to 
and no evidence that it could have offered relevant to the particular 
limited issue then before the lower court. 
-10-
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Presumptions Support Trial Court's Decision 
It was on a strictly infonllal basis, after closing of court, 
that Judge Sawaya before leaving observed the cab latches which 
defendants-respondents had set up in the courtroom at the beginning 
of the hearing. No testimony was taken. All present treated the 
observation of the cab latches as strictly informal and off-the-record. 
There is absolutely no basis in fact for the assertion by 
defendants-respondents that the proceedings continued unreported. The 
proceedings did not continue. 
Defendants-Respondents assert that evidence pertinent to 
the questions involved on this appeal was submitted to the lower 
court at the hearing of July 12, 1973, which was unreported. However, 
it is clear from the cited portion of the record (R-264) that the hearing 
had to do with the Judgment and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law prepared and submitted by counsel, that the evidence was of a 
documentary nature, and that such evidence had nothing to do with the 
so-called "black cab latch". 
As to the 993 pages of evidentiary testimony that are not 
before this Court (because they provided the basis for the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law which are part of the Record and other-
wise have no bearing on the issues on this appeal), it would have been 
presumptious for plaintiff-appellant to have designated those pages 
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for the Record. Defendants-Respondents undoubtedly did not do so 
because they recognized that none of those pages are relevant here. 
THE DECISION BELOW llAS AN 
ADEQUATE EVIDENTIARY BASIS 
The Trial Court's Findings Are Adequate 
Defendants-Respondents argue that it may be regarded as 
implicit that the lower court found that the "black cab latch" falls 
within the scope of the claims of Brimhall Patent No. 3, 797, 882, but 
this in no way follows from the actual finding of the lower court that 
such accused cab latch "is of the type for which royalties are to be 
paid by the plaintiff to the defendants" (R. 869). 
The lower court has consistently refused to consider questions ' 
of infringement and validity (R. 267, 580-581, 684, 858). Nothing was 
said by the lower court that indicates there was any change from this 
position in the making of its decision. 
As was stated in the case of Trico Products Corporotion v. 
Roberk Company, 369 F. Supp. 1146; 178 USPQ 589, 591 (D. C. Conn. , 
1973). which is cited by defendants-respondents on page 20 of their bn. 
"In determining whether the defendant's 
accused device infringes, one of the fundamental 
tenents of the patent law is that nothing can infringe 
unless it trespasses on a claim. As Mr. justice 
Brown explained in McClain v. Onmayer, 
141 U.S. 419,425 (1891), 
-12-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'*** nothing can be held to be an 
infringement which does not fall within 
the terms the p3temee has himself chosen 
to express his invention.' 
In other words, as succinctly summarized in Aro Mfg. 
Co. v. Convertible Top Co., 365 U.S. 336, 339, 
128 USPQ 354, 356-357, and n.4 (1961), '***the claims 
made in the patent are the sole measure of the grant***'." 
The Nordell-Kimball Patent Is Not Relevant 
Defendants-Respondents argue that because the Nordell-
Kimball patent was issued seven (7) months before issuance of the 
Brimhall Patent and because pending application are not considered 
by the Patent Office in examining another application by a different 
applicant, that the Patent Office did not have the Brimhall patent before 
it and that issuance of both patents does not attest to a significant dif-
ference between the two. 
This is a ridiculous argument in the face of the fact, noted 
on page 10 of plaintiff-appellant's brief, that the existence and signi-
ficant details of the Brimhall application were brought to the Examiner's 
attention in the later-filed Nordell-Kimball application (as was proper, 
and necessary to avoid a charge of fraud on the Patent Office). Pending 
applications are always available for inspection by any Examiner who 
may have an interest in doing so. lf the differences pointed out in the 
Nordell-Kimball cab latch had not impressed the Examiner of that 
application as being sufficiently unique and significGnt to warrant 
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issuance of an additional patent, he could hl ve rejected the claims ~1 , 
unpatentable over the admittedly prior Brimhall cab latch. In view of 
the Nordell-Kimball reference to the Brimhall application by officio! 
Serial Number, it is reasonable to assume that the Examiner did 
inspect it in consonance with his duty to prevent the issuance of 
spurious patents. 
Physical Observation Of The Products Is Sufficient 
Defendants-Respondents continue to insist that the lower court 
made its decision on the basis of physical observation of the two cab 
latches in question. This it could not have done and did not profess to 
do. It used language for the minute entry (R. 754) and for its amendal 
order (R. 869) that clearly indicates otherwise. It relied only on what 
was unchallenged, i.e. that the two cab latches are of the same type. 
The cases cited by defendants-respondents as showing that 
expert testimony is unnecessary and that a court can decide the questior 
of infringement and validity by mere observation are not appropo. Thu: 
Ronel Corporation v. Anchor Lock of Florida, Inc., 325 F. 2d 889, 
140 USPQ 7, (CA5, 1963) dealt with a metal fastner which comprised 
a metal plate with projecting barbs for securing members together. 
The court compared this simple item having no moving pans with sirni· 
lar devices shown by prior patents and decided the patent at issue iiJ' 
invalid. The question of infringement was not reached. Interlago. 
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A. G. v. F. A. 0. Schwnrz, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 170, 187 USPQ 580 
(N.D. Gn. 1975) dealt with interlocking toy building blocks, again 
having no moving parts, and made a similar holding of patent invali-
dity. Again, the question of infringement was not reached. Trico 
Products Corporation v. Roberk Company, supra, dealt with replace-
ment blades for windshield wipers, again no moving parts. The court 
decided that no expert testimony was necessary to show that the accused 
structure did not infringe, because it clearly lacked structure recited 
in the patent claims. 
In the present case, the lower court did not place its decision 
on observation of the two latches or comparison with the claims of the 
Brimhall patent. Moreover, the cab lqtches in question are relatively 
complicated, with moving parts actuated hydraulically. Obviously, 
they are of the same type, but there are significant structural and 
functional differences. 
PATENT VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT 
Defendants-Respondents insist that plaintiff-appellants seek 
to convert a post-judgment proceeding into a patent infringement 
lawsuit which is exclusively under Federal jurisdiction. Yet, in 
suits involving whether or not royalties were and are due, Federal 
courts themselves have rejected jurisdiction in favor of State courts. 
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Thus, in the recent case of Milprint, Inc. v. Cunvood, Inc., 
422 F. Supp. 579; 192 USPQ 769 (DCE Wisc. Feb. 24, 1977), the Fui-
eral court dismissed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment of 
noninfringement and patent invalidity. The Federal suit was brought 
by the defendant in an action in the State court for royalties due under 
a license agreement. A motion to remand to the State court was gramc' 
The Federal court said, Page 772: 
"Furthermore, there is no question that contract 
actions based on patent license agreements and 
involving defenses of patent noninfringement or 
invalidity may be brought and maintained in state 
court. Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 162 USPQ 
1(1969), and Product Engineering and Manufacturing, 
Inc. v. Barnes, 424 F. 2d 42, 165 USPQ 229 (10th 
Cir. 1970)." 
Patent Validity is Res Judicata 
In arguing that the question of patent validity is res judicata, 
defendants-respondents forget the fact that plaintiff-appellant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment of Patent Invalidity of May 27, 1974 
(R. 564) had nothing to do with the question of infringement by the 
so-called "black cab latch" and was dismissed solely on the ground 
that it was not timely filed (R. 581). 
There has been no adjudication of the question of validity, 
nor could there have been, except by a granting of plaimiff-appellanc's 
Motion holding the Brimhall patent invalid. The Motion was not grantc. 
and the question of validity remains a viable one for consideration bi 
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che trial court along with the question of infringement. 
In this connection, it should be noted that the court in the 
Trico case (supra), after finding the patent not infringed, went on to 
ronsider validity and found the patent invalid. It said in footnote 6: 
"Consideration of the validity of the Lenz 
patent is required so that the public interest will 
be adequately protected. Beckman Instruments, 
Inc. v. Chemcronics, Inc., 428 F. 2d 555, 557, 
165 USPQ 355, 356-357 (Sch Cir.), cert. denied, 
400 U.S. 956, 168 USPQ 1(1970)." 
Patent Infringement Inferred 
Contrary to the assertion by defendants-respondents, there 
was no finding by the lower court -- inferentially or otherwise --
that the so-called "black cab latch" falls within the scope of the Brimhall 
patent. Because there was no such finding, plaintiff-appellant has taken 
this appeal on the ground that it was reversible error for the lower 
court to find that such "black cab latch" does fall within the scope of 
the Amended Decree of July 30, 1975. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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